

2/25/73

Samuels
Summary of
2/25/73 talks

I. Main points in Ismail's presentation:

A. Urgency: a settlement in 1973. The area can't stand waiting for 15 years while new relationships evolve, as some Israeli leaders recommend.

B. Objective:

1. A Middle East of strong, healthy, cooperative, independent states. Whether Israel is among them depends on whether Israel recognizes itself as a Middle Eastern state. A settlement could be a basis for normalization of relations, but that would take a long time.
2. An Egypt-Israel agreement would establish a state of peace. This would end the state of war, but would not be full peace.

-- This agreement would produce a situation different from the Egypt-Israel relationship before 1967 in that it would:

- allow Israel free passage through waterways;
- end the boycott on third-party goods;
- commit Egypt to prevent guerrilla

~~This clause~~ operations from Egyptian soil and ~~any~~ ^{as far as possible} end Egypt's "reservation" on multilateral agreements;

reduces -- commit each side to non-intervention.
 -- It would not include exchanging ambassadors, trade agreements, borders open for routine travel. These would be characteristics of later normalization.

3. Normalization is an objective, but that will take time. Will depend on a refugee settlement.

C. There are two main aspects of a settlement:

1. Israel's return to pre-war borders.
2. Palestinian rights. The problem should be reduced to the size of Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine deciding how to divide the territory and how to live together.
 - Egypt would pose no objection if Hussein got the West Bank back and then gave the West Bank Palestinians a chance to determine their own future.
 - A refugee settlement is necessary.
 - Gaza must have self-determination. Egypt will handle the negotiation leading to this.

D. Israel's "legitimate" security concerns can be met:

- "Legitimate" concerns include international guarantees and Egyptian peace commitments.
- "Illegitimate concerns" are a desire for a presence at Sharm al-Shaikh and in the Sinai. These are political.

E. The problem can be settled by stages and sectors, but they must be linked so as to lead to an overall settlement. There must be a full settlement. Egypt cannot accept a partial withdrawal "left hanging."

F. The big powers and UN should state what kind of Israel they envisage.

(unilaterally at)



II What was new in Ismail's presentation?

In its essential points this was the familiar Egyptian position. However, there seemed to be three new points of emphasis, none dramatic:

A. Normalization of relations between

Egypt and Israel. Although Ismail said this would take a long time, he spoke of normalization as being at the end of the road. If this could be developed concretely and related to steps in the settlement process, it could be useful in persuading Israel that Egypt would be willing to have a normal relationship.


B. Egypt has not publicly endorsed

Hussein's plan for a United Arab Kingdom.

Ismail seemed to say Egypt would pose no objection to Hussein's getting the West Bank back and granting self-determination.

C. Egypt has indicated before that it does not want Gaza but that it must

remain Arab. More seemed to be said yesterday than previously about the mechanics (UN auspices) with Egypt handling its negotiation) of achieving self-determination.



III. Questions for further elaboration

The following are questions for further Egyptian elaboration either in discussion now or in writing before the next meeting:

A. Can Egypt be more precise about the relationship that would exist between Egypt and Israel when a peace agreement is signed and about how further normalization would take place? Can normalization be related to other developments (e.g. a refugee settlement)? To phasing of agreements?

Why not distinguish between "peace" and "normalization" rather than between de facto and de jure peace?

B. How, precisely, might Israel's security needs

be met? What measures would a sovereign Egypt allow?
→ Could restoration of Egyptian sovereignty + Israeli withdrawal be phased differently?

C. How does Egypt envision the staging of

agreements? Under what circumstances, if any, could Egypt begin negotiating the terms of a first-step withdrawal

from the Canal? (Is there a way to start with the so-called interim agreement?)

D. What modifications might be made

in the Egyptian position in return for what modifications in the Israeli position?

E. Exactly how might Gaza's self-determination be negotiated and arranged?

F. How would a refugee settlement be negotiated?

G. What is the relationship of an Egypt-Israel settlement to Jordan-Israel, Syria-Israel, and refugee settlements?

IV. Other points to stress

- A. The purpose of these talks has been exploratory -- to see whether the basis for a settlement can be developed by some fresh thinking. Believe it was understood that our willingness to meet was an indication of our interest in a settlement, but the fact of our meeting implied no commitment to follow one course or another.
- B. Egyptians don't believe it, but we have no magic for producing Israeli agreement to Egyptian terms. If there is an agreement, it will require difficult decisions on both sides. Only readiness to make such decisions can turn the course of negotiations. We don't want the Egyptians to have any illusions about what is possible as a result of these meetings.
- C. Reiterate: Please give serious consideration to what you can give us to make the case that Egypt is ready to move toward normalization of relations.

[See Peter's checklist for meeting agenda and procedural points to be covered.]